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Abstract
Genome-wide sequencing technologies are beginning to be used in projects that have
both clinical diagnostic and research components. The clinical application of this tech-
nology, which generates a huge amount of information of varying diagnostic certainty,
involves addressing a number of challenges to establish appropriate standards. In this
article, we explore the way that UK law may respond to three of these key challenges
and could establish new legal duties in relation to feedback of findings that are unrelated
to the presenting condition (secondary, additional or incidental findings); duties towards
genetic relatives as well as the patient and duties on the part of researchers and
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professionals who do not have direct contact with patients. When considering these
issues, the courts will take account of European and international comparisons, devel-
oping guidance and relevant ethical, social and policy factors. The UK courts will also be
strongly influenced by precedent set in case law.
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Introduction
Clinical Genetics is the branch of medicine which deals with the diagnosis, management
and counselling of patients with genetic disorders. Such genetic conditions are diverse
and often individually rare and include developmental disorders, dysmorphisms, inher-
ited cancers, neurological and cardiac conditions. In providing molecular diagnoses for
their patients, Clinical Geneticists have utilized sequencing technologies and array
methods to provide information on pathogenic mutations in the DNA of their patients
which may explain their genetic condition.1 Historically, sequencing methods only
allowed single genes to be ‘read’ or sequenced for mutations at one time. The introduc-
tion of ‘next-generation sequencing technologies’ (NGS) enabled panels of genes to be
tested simultaneously, thus significantly increasing the chances of providing patients
with a molecular diagnosis for their condition.2 Most recently, innovations in genome
sequencing technology have transformed the prospect of providing patients with genetic
diseases with a molecular diagnosis.3 Instead of relying on knowledge of a causative
gene, these methods enable the entire genome of a patient to be screened in a non-
hypothesis-driven manner.4 While the process of genome sequencing generates very
significant challenges in analysing the gigabytes of sequence data and identifying the
pathogenic variant for a given disease among the thousands of naturally occurring benign
variants,5 it has been demonstrated to increase the diagnostic yield by 20–30% over
existing methods.6
1. H.L. Rehm, ‘Disease-Targeted Sequencing: A Cornerstone in the Clinic’, Nature Reviews
Genetics 14 (2013), p. 295.
2. S. Goodwin, J.D. McPherson and W. Richard McCombie, ‘Coming of Age: Ten Years of
Next-Generation Sequencing Technologies’, Nature Reviews Genetics 17 (2016), p. 333.
3. L.G. Biesecker and R.C. Green, ‘Diagnostic Clinical Genome and Exome Sequencing’, New
England Journal of Medicine 370 (2014), p. 2418.
4. J.C. Taylor et al., ‘Factors Influencing Success of Clinical Genome Sequencing across a Broad
Spectrum of Disorders’, Nature Genetics 47 (2015), p. 717.
5. C.F. Wright et al., ‘Policy Challenges of Clinical Genome Sequencing’, British Medical
Journal 347 (2013), p. f6845. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.f6845.
6. Taylor et al., ‘Factors Influencing Success’, 2015; C. Gilissen et al., ‘Genome Sequencing
Identifies Major Causes of Severe Intellectual Disability’, Nature 511 (2014), p. 344.
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The potential benefits of an accurate genetic diagnosis are wide ranging: they can
direct appropriate medical evaluation and interventions, which can be made earlier,
saving care, treatment and other costs through the patient’s lifetime. They can also direct
appropriate social and educational care, provide a tool for identifying other family
members at risk of disease development and provide information on which to base
reproductive and other lifestyle choices.
Many large-scale research, clinical and hybrid genome sequencing initiatives are now
underway, including the Genomics England 100,000 Genomes Project in the United
Kingdom.7 This project will sequence the genomes of patients with a rare disease, some
family members and patients with cancer, and aims to provide a diagnosis where there
was not one before.8 This is one of the largest clinical sequencing projects in the world
and it aims to create a new genomic medicine service for the National Health Service
(NHS).
The application of genome sequencing in clinical care raises challenges that are being
identified and debated around the world.9 Three of these – the problem of secondary
findings, the extent of duties to genetic relatives and potential duties owed by researchers
and non-clinical professionals – are a particular challenge for the development of new
legal standards in the United Kingdom. This article aims to identify the legal duties that
may arise for healthcare professionals (HCPs) and researchers in this rapidly evolving
area of clinical practise. Two of the authors of this article have recently published more
specific articles on aspects of the duty of care in genetic medicine in this journal. Chico
focuses on the duty of clinicians to warn their patients’ families of elevated genetic risk
and presents an argument for the imposition of a duty of care based on a developmental
approach to ‘wrong’ and ‘harm’ in negligence.10 Fay also presents an argument in favour
of a duty to disclose to relatives being created using the current law.11 This article has a
broader scope and explores a range of potential novel duties, including duties to relatives
that may arise in clinical genomics.
Challenges for clinical practice
Clinical Genetics is a medical speciality concerned with assessing the probability of a
condition having a genetic basis, providing a clinical and molecular diagnosis for
7. Genomics England is a wholly owned company of the UK Department of Health.
8. Available at: www.genomicsengland.co.uk/the-100000-genomes-project (accessed 10
February 2017).
9. A comprehensive deliberation of the ethical, legal and social issues for clinical genomics in
the United Kingdom, based on a series of workshop discussions with HCPs and other experts
has been carried out by the PHG Foundation in their Realising Genomics project: A. Hall, T.
Finnegan and C. Alberg, Realising Genomics in Clinical Practice (Cambridge: PHG
Foundation, 2014).
10. V. Chico, ‘Non-Disclosure of Genetic Risks The Case for Developing Legal Wrongs’,
Medical Law International 1–2 (2016), pp. 3–26.
11. M. Fay, ‘Negligence, Genetics and Families a Duty to Disclose Actionable Risks’, Medical
Law International 3–4 (2016), pp. 115–142.
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patients, directing evaluation and management of genetic conditions appropriate to
diagnosis and provision of counselling and information to support decision-making for
patients and families. Other clinical specialities increasingly provide genetic services,
often in tandem with Clinical Genetics as part of clinical care or research. Clinical
Genetics is unusual in that it is concerned with the management of a family rather than
one individual, a detailed multi-generation family history is collected and stored routi-
nely and communication of risk to relatives is integral.12 Genetic testing is frequently
offered, with the aim of providing a molecular diagnosis, identifying at risk family
members and risk of recurrence. Single gene and multigene panels are being supple-
mented with ‘whole exome sequencing’ (WES) or ‘whole genome sequencing’ (WGS)
particularly when the condition is genetically heterogeneous or when no causative
mutation is detected in gene panel testing (at present in clinical care WES is used, but
it is expected that WGS will be the norm in just a few years’ time). Assessments of
predicted pathogenicity of genetic variants are made by qualified clinical scientists,
who typically issue a report including those variants considered highly likely or likely
to be pathogenic, as well as those of uncertain pathogenicity (variant of uncertain
significance). Confirmed genetic variants are then reported by an accredited laboratory
to the referring HCP. In reaching this assessment, all available molecular, family
segregation and population data are evaluated. However, due to the complexity and
(often very) limited nature of these data, different laboratories sometimes reach dif-
ferent conclusions about the pathogenicity of a given variant. Variation in developing
practice may be problematic in determining the standard of care that could be consid-
ered reasonable in the law.
Secondary findings.Amajor issue for emerging practice is that of genomic variants that are
considered secondary to the presenting health condition. These have often been called
‘incidental findings’ and characterized as unanticipated variants of potential clinical
significance that are unrelated to the disease that prompted the sequencing.13 However,
because secondary results are sometimes specifically sought, or should be expected as
part of WES/WGS,14 other terms have been suggested, such as secondary findings15 or
12. S. Dheensa et al., ‘Health-Care Professionals’ Responsibility to Patients’ Relatives in
Genetic Medicine: A Systematic Review and Synthesis of Empirical Research’, Genetics
in Medicine 18 (2016), pp. 290–301; R. Gilbar, ‘Communicating Genetic Information in the
Family: The Familial Relationship as the Forgotten Factor’, Journal of Medical Ethics 33
(2007), p. 390; M. Parker and A.M. Lucassen, ‘Genetic Information: A Joint Account?’,
British Medical Journal 329 (2004), p. 165.
13. N. Tan et al., ‘Is “Incidental Finding” the Best Term?: A Study of Patients’ Preferences’,
Genetics in Medicine 19 (2017), pp. 176–181.
14. J.Y. Hehir-Kwa et al., ‘Towards a European Consensus for Reporting Incidental Findings
During Clinical NGS Testing’, European Journal of Human Genetics 23 (2015), p. 1601.
15. S.S. Kalia et al., ‘Recommendations for Reporting of Secondary Findings in Clinical Exome
and Genome Sequencing, 2016 Update (ACMG SF v2.0): A Policy Statement of the
American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics’, Genetics in Medicine 19 (2017),
p. 249.
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additional findings.16 Management of secondary findings is challenging: they are
likely to be unexpected, and, in an individual who appears not to have any symp-
toms of the secondary condition, the significance is uncertain. This raises questions
about the standard of care that may be considered reasonable in law.17 Should such
variants be reported? If so, how and under what circumstances? What medical
follow-up is indicated? According to which guidelines? Should uncertain results
be updated if they later become considered pathogenic and by whom? Recommen-
dations for practice will guide the UK courts and legal authorities in their consid-
erations of the duty of care,18 and there are developing recommendations on best
practice in this context.
One approach, recommended by the American College of Medical Genetics and
Genomics (ACMG), is to screen a specific list of genes in individuals of all ages
undergoing clinical exome and genome sequencing. The ACMG proposed a list of
56 genes that are associated with later onset conditions and/or have a long asympto-
matic phase, including inherited cancer predisposition and inherited heart conditions.
The ACMG suggests that genomic variants of ‘known’ (or in some cases ‘expected’)
pathogenicity be routinely reported back to physicians and their patients unless the
patient opts out of this analysis.19 It is estimated that such variants might occur in
around 1–7% of individuals.20 Some experts are cautious of this approach.21 Perhaps
the greatest concerns are that the evidence that a pathogenic variant will give rise to a
disease in an individual who has no other signs of the disease is much less clear, and
that this could ultimately give rise to reporting of false positives with the potential for
harm due to anxiety, unwarranted screening and risk management interventions.22 The
ACMG acknowledges this problem of correctly predicting ‘penetrance’ (the likelihood
of the disease manifesting), and their approach is to curate the list of genes in light of
16. L. Eckstein, J.R. Garrett and B.E. Berkman, ‘A Framework for Analyzing the Ethics of
Disclosing Genetic Research Findings’, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 42 (2014), p.
190.
17. A.L. McGuire et al., ‘Can I Be Sued for That? Liability Risk and the Disclosure of Clinically
Significant Genetic Research Findings’, Genome Research 24 (2014), p. 719; M.C. Ploem,
‘Handling Unsolicited Findings in Clinical Care: A Legal Perspective’, European Journal of
Health Law 21 (2014), p. 489; E.W. Clayton et al., ‘Managing Incidental Genomic Findings:
Legal Obligations of Clinicians’, Genetics in Medicine 15 (2013), p. 624.
18. The Supreme Court has recently demonstrated the importance of authoritative guidelines in
setting a legal standard of care in Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC
11; [2015] 2 WLR 768.
19. The initial recommendation in 2013 was that some actionable results should be returned to
patients without an opt-out. ACMG Board of Directors, ‘ACMG Policy Statement: Updated
Recommendations Regarding Analysis and Reporting of Secondary Findings in Clinical
Genome-Scale Sequencing’, Genetics in Medicine 17 (2015), p. 68.
20. S. Schuol et al., ‘So Rare We Need to Hunt for Them: Reframing the Ethical Debate on
Incidental Findings’, Genome Medicine 7 (2015), p. 83.
21. C.F. Wright et al., ‘Policy Challenges’, 2013; C.G. van El et al., ‘Whole-Genome Sequencing
in Health Care’, European Journal of Human Genetics 21 (2013), p. S1.
22. Hehir-Kwa et al., ‘Towards a European Consensus’, p. 1602.
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any new evidence revising estimates of penetrance – potentially removing genes from
the list.23
By contrast, in order to minimize the challenges presented by secondary findings,
the European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG) recommends an approach to WES/
WGS that reduces the potential for generating incidental findings. They recommend
an initial targeted analysis of genes known to be associated with the presenting
condition in and continuing to unrestricted analysis of whole exome/genome data
only if a causative variant is not identified in the targeted analysis.24 The ESHG
recommends that a protocol should be developed that sets out the approach that will
be taken to incidental findings and that, in principle, a HCP should report an unso-
licited finding if it is indicative of serious health problems, unless the patient indicated
beforehand that he did not want to know.25 The PHG Foundation similarly recom-
mends an approach to limit the generation of incidental findings but, if found, recom-
mends that the decision to feedback is guided by the consent process and ‘informed by
clinical judgment.’26
In current practice, decision-making pathways for such results may involve the use
of a multi-disciplinary team (MDT) or advisory board to guide the evaluation and
reporting of secondary findings.27 Although promoting a thorough analysis and con-
sensus in decision-making, this is a resource and labour-intensive approach to result
interpretation that may not be feasible at scale.28 Approaches that are informed by
professional judgment also have the potential to create significant differences in
relation to the standard of care, which could pose difficult questions for the standard
required by law. The generation of large amounts of genetic information and the
uncertainty involved also complicates the process of obtaining a patient’s informed
consent to sequencing. Informed consent is of central importance in clinical genomics,
not only because it is legally required to legitimize the taking of samples and the
secondary use of genomic data29 but also because adequate information and commu-
nication is required to help patients understand the potential consequences of genome
or exome sequencing and make autonomous choices about the information they may
23. Kalia et al., ‘Recommendations for Reporting of Secondary’, p. 253.
24. C.G. Van El et al, ‘Whole-Genome Sequencing in Health Care: Recommendations of the
European Society of Human Genetics’, European Journal of Human Genetics 21 (2013), pp.
580–584. DOI: 10.1038/ejhg.2013.46.
25. Mandatory feedback of additional findings is, however, normal practise in some parts of
Europe: T. Rigter et al., ‘Reflecting on Earlier Experiences with Unsolicited Findings: Points
to Consider for Next-Generation Sequencing and Informed Consent in Diagnostics’, Human
Mutation 34 (2013), p. 1322.
26. Hall, Finnegan and Alberg, Realising Genomics, Recommendation 9.
27. E. Ormondroyd et al., ‘Insights from Early Experience of a Rare Disease Genomic Medicine
Multidisciplinary Team: A Qualitative Study’, European Journal of Human Genetics 25
(2017), pp. 680–686. DOI: 10.1038/ejhg.2017.37.
28. T. Rigter et al., ‘Informed Consent for Exome Sequencing in Diagnostics: Exploring First
Experiences and Views of Professionals and Patients’, Clinical Genetics 85 (2014), p. 417.
29. Data Protection Act 1998, sch. 3, para. 1.
Mitchell et al. 163
receive.30 Some suggestions have been made to enhance the level of autonomous
choice that patients have over the return of secondary findings. One proposed
approach is the separation of results into a number of potential categories, termed
‘bins’ with decisions about feedback made by the patient for each category of poten-
tial result.31 Another possible approach is a mixed version, whereby certain categories
of results (e.g. actionable and child-onset conditions) are automatically returned as
part of the standard of care.32 However, ensuring informed consent in genomics is
challenging, particularly if information is provided at a single clinic visit prior to
testing.33 There is no clear position in current practice. In some projects, patients may
be asked whether they wish for a search for secondary or incidental findings. Alter-
natively, patients may simply consent to sequencing on the basis that they may be
informed of certain results if the clinicians consider them important – for example, if
they are both serious and actionable. This is current practice in some countries such as
the Netherlands. If patients do not want to be informed of these findings, the sequen-
cing will not be performed using WES or WGS techniques.
Blurring of research and clinical activity. Approaches to secondary findings are complicated
by the fact that the technology is moving from the research domain into a clinical realm
and currently diagnostic exome/genome sequencing is used in a way that combines
research and clinical care.34 Projects such as the 100,000 Genomes Project, which
recruits patients and relatives within the NHS for diagnostic purposes (there is a man-
datory feedback policy for primary or pertinent findings), also have research aims. This
is arguably part of an established tradition for clinical genetics, where existing clinical
diagnostic tests have sometimes been supplemented with research-based tests.35 How-
ever, research and clinical care traditionally have different goals. The goal of clinical
care is to provide a benefit to the patient, whereas research is designed to produce
generalizable knowledge to benefit society, and participants do not necessarily receive
results from research. These differences have been reflected in the legal framework, and,
while HCPs clearly owe legal duties to their patients, researchers have been less likely to
owe duties to participants, particularly those with whom they have little or no contact.
When research and care become blurred, for example, when patients with undiagnosed
conditions turn to exome or genome sequencing for answers, ‘ascertaining when clinical
30. V. Chico, ‘Known Unknowns and Unknown Unknowns: The Potential and the Limits of
Autonomy in Disclosure of Genetic Risk’, Professional Negligence 28 (2012), p. 162.
31. J.S. Berg, M.J. Khoury and J.P. Evans, ‘Deploying Whole Genome Sequencing in Clinical
Practice and Public Health: Meeting the Challenge One Bin at a Time’, Genetics in Medicine
13 (2011), p. 499.
32. H.J. Jacob et al., ‘Genomics in Clinical Practice: Lessons from the Front Lines’, Science
Translational Medicine 5 (2013), p. 194cm5.
33. P.S. Appelbaum et al., ‘Models of Consent to Return of Incidental Findings in Genomic
Research’, Hastings Center Report 44 (2014), p. 22.
34. S. Dheensa et al., ‘Management of Incidental Findings in Clinical Genomic Sequencing
Studies’, eLS (2016), pp. 1–7. DOI: 10.1002/9780470015902.a0025838.
35. Hall, Finnegan and Alberg, Realising Genomics, p. 13.
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care has morphed into research (or vice versa) can be quite difficult’36 and there may be
an increased danger of ‘therapeutic misconception’ (a misguided assumption that the
researcher is acting exclusively in the best interest of the individual patient).37 To ensure
that participants understand the differences between their clinical care and genomic
research and to ensure that researchers are clear in their obligations and not unnecessarily
diverted from producing important generalizable knowledge, it is important that research
and clinical pathways are distinguished as clearly as possible.38 As we consider the
section ‘Is a duty of care owed by researchers, scientists and non-clinical professionals?’,
although the courts are likely to take into account the different resources and aims of
clinical care and research, where there is close interaction between care and research,
there is the real possibility that genomics researchers will be found to owe a legal duty to
disclose findings to participants.
The rights and interests of genetic relatives. A third challenge for genetics and genomics in
medicine, whether using individual gene tests or genome-wide approaches, is the incor-
poration of familial interests as well as those of the patient or participant. Patient con-
fidentiality is a cornerstone of healthcare and, although many patients may be happy to
disclose genetic information to relatives, the extent of HCPs or researchers’ legal obli-
gations towards family members when the patient refuses disclosure is unclear.39 Cur-
rently, the default position within existing guidance is for HCPs to treat information as
confidential to the individual patients and disclosure without consent as a rare excep-
tion.40 However, there have been powerful ethical arguments that a different approach to
information sharing and confidentiality should be taken in genetic medicine. Parker and
Lucassen argue that, because genetic information is ‘spontaneous mutations aside, essen-
tially and unavoidably familial in nature’,41 it should be treated as held on a ‘joint
account’ with other family members.42 Doing so would shift the default position from
patient confidentiality to one where the information from clinical genetic testing is
routinely shared with family members unless the patient is at risk of serious harm. Gilbar
adopts a relational approach to autonomy which emphasizes that the ‘patient develops
his or her autonomy by engaging with those around him or her’,43 to argue that the effect
36. B.E. Berkman, S. Chandros Hull and L. Eckstein, ‘The Unintended Implications of Blurring
the Line Between Research and Clinical Care in a Genomic Age’, Personalized Medicine 11
(2014), p. 285, p. 286.
37. Hall, Finnegan and Alberg, Realising Genomics, p. 77.
38. G.P. Jarvik et al., ‘Return of Genomic Results to Research Participants: The Floor, the
Ceiling, and the Choices in Between,’ American Journal of Human Genetics 94 (2014),
p. 818; Berkman, Chandros Hull and Eckstein, ‘The Unintended Implications’, 2014, p. 293.
39. Dheensa et al., ‘Health-Care Professionals’ Responsibility’, pp. 290–301.
40. S. Dheensa, A. Fenwick and A. Lucassen, ‘“Is This Knowledge Mine and Nobody Else’s? I
Don’t Feel That.” Patient Views about Consent, Confidentiality and Information-Sharing in
Genetic Medicine’, Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (2016), pp. 174–179.
41. Parker and Lucassen, ‘Genetic Information’, 2004.
42. Op. cit., p. 165.
43. Gilbar, ‘Communicating Genetic Information in the Family’, 2007.
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on the dynamics of a family should be one of the criteria used by professionals in
deciding whether to share information with relatives. This argument draws on empirical
evidence that patients and professionals do take a largely familial approach to genetic
testing,44 an approach that has been reflected in practise and guidelines.45 However,
there are challenges to more family-centric approaches.46 Liao argues that, considering
the possibility of spontaneous mutations and incomplete penetrance of some variants,
risk to relatives may be lower than at first sight and only in a few cases is the significance
of the information sufficient to override confidentiality.47 It is also questioned whether
guidance to disclose information to relatives takes sufficient account of the possibility
of the relatives having an interest in not knowing (a right not to know).48 Because it is
impossible to make a free choice about not knowing genetic information, Laurie
argues that this interest is best protected by respecting the relative’s privacy, which
should only be invaded if good cause is shown.49 The effect of this is not to prevent
disclosure but to require that HCPs consider how an individual might react and the
strength of the clinical considerations justifying disclosure. While the ethical debate
includes a range of nuanced approaches to the interests of genetic relatives, the law in
the United Kingdom has, until recently, denied claims made by family members for a
failure to warn of genetic risk. As we discuss below, this is a new area of legal
challenge and there are reasons to believe that some claims by genetic relatives may
succeed. This issue arises in all forms of genetic testing, but genomic technologies
potentially increase the amount of information that may be valuable to a relative.50 In
this article, we explore the potential legal duties that may develop in the United
Kingdom in response to these key challenges for clinical practice and analyse how
these duties may be determined in the courts.
Establishing novel legal duties for clinical genomics
Our analysis is focused on the potential existence and nature of a legal duty of care
in UK law. There is no legislation on the duties involved in genome sequencing in
44. R. Gilbar, ‘The Passive Patient and Disclosure of Genetic Information: Can English Tort
Law Protect the Relatives’ Right to Know?’, International Journal of Law, Policy and the
Family 30 (2016), p. 79, p. 81.
45. S. Dheensa, A. Fenwick and A. Lucassen, ‘Approaching Confidentiality at a Familial Level
in Genomic Medicine: A Focus Group Study with Healthcare Professionals’, British Medical
Journal Open 7 (2017), p. 9. DOI: 10.1136/bmjopen-2016-012443.
46. D. Bell and B. Bennett, ‘Genetic Secrets and the Family’, Medical Law Review 9 (2001), p.
130.
47. S.M. Liao, ‘Is There a Duty to Share Genetic Information?’, Journal of Medical Ethics 35
(2009), p. 306.
48. G.T. Laurie, ‘Recognizing the Right Not to Know: Conceptual, Professional, and Legal
Implications’, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 42 (2014), p. 53.
49. Op. cit.
50. A.M. Lucassen and R.S. Houlston, ‘The Challenges of Genome Analysis in the Health Care
Setting’, Genes 5 (2014), p. 576.
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the United Kingdom, and, in the absence of this, any new legal duties on the part of
professionals in clinical genomics will be established within the common law of
negligence. Some direction on potential duties may be derived from international
human rights documents, such as the treaties of the Council of Europe. The Con-
vention on Human Rights and Biomedicine51 and its Additional Protocols set out
that an individual is entitled to know any information collected about his or her
health,52 including information collected during research53 and any information
‘collected about his or her health derived’ from a genetic test for health purposes.54
The distinction between research and clinical genetic testing under these instruments
is that results of research testing should only be offered if they are of relevance to
health; this is not likely to be established for many genetic results without follow-up
investigation and validation. The Convention also suggests that diagnosis should not
extend beyond the complaints of the patient – limiting the use of wider tests where
narrower tests are available.55
However, because the United Kingdom is not a signatory to the Oviedo Convention,
it does not imply the existence of a legal duty of care within the established rules and
principles of the law of negligence. In negligence, a duty of care may be owed to take
reasonable care not to injure others who it could be reasonably foreseen would be
harmed by action or inaction.56 The most common test for establishing a novel duty of
care in negligence was set out by the House of Lords in Caparo Industries plc. v.
Dickman.57 This test requires that three criteria must be fulfilled before a duty of care is
imposed: foreseeability of the harm, proximity and that it is ‘just, fair and reasonable’
to impose a duty. This third requirement is a broad one that can include consideration
of policy factors. When a duty of care is established, the legal standard of care will also
be determined (often as part of an overlapping analysis), along with determinations of
whether or not there has been a breach of that duty.
The challenges for clinical genomics highlighted above give rise to three key legal
questions within the law of negligence. First, will there be legal duties to provide
secondary findings when identified? Second, are duties owed to relatives as well as
patients? Third, are duties owed by researchers and other professionals who do not
normally have direct interactions with patients?
51. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard
to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
(opened for signature 4 March 1997, entered into force 1 December 1999) CETS No. 164.
52. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Article 10 (2).
53. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Concerning
Biomedical Research (2005) Article 26.
54. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning
Genetic Testing for Health Purposes (2008) Article 16 (2).
55. Ploem, ‘Handling Unsolicited Findings in Clinical Care’, p. 499.
56. Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
57. Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605.
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Is there a duty to feed back secondary findings?
One of the key ethical issues for genome sequencing is whether there is a duty to
investigate and feed back secondary findings. Determining a legal duty will be a question
of whether some parts of practice should be subject to a legal duty of care and, if a duty of
care is found to exist, the appropriate standard of care. As outlined above, currently a
range of different approaches are taken concerning secondary findings (results that are
not pertinent to the condition under immediate investigation). The ACMG recommends
active investigation of a number of selected genes while other organizations, such as the
ESHG, prefer a targeted approach to testing that limits the discovery of incidental
findings in genes.
A ‘reasonable’ approach to secondary findings. There is as yet no established legal duty to
look for or return secondary findings in the United Kingdom, so a claim relating to such
findings would need to satisfy the court that it would be ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to
impose a duty. In practise, this is a wide-ranging assessment that can include consider-
ation of current policies, standards and the potential burden for clinicians and scientists
in identifying, interpreting and validating secondary findings. To actively look for find-
ings could be a more onerous obligation than to validate and return findings that are
discovered unintentionally during analysis – true incidental findings. As we discuss
further below, when WES or WGS is carried out as a research endeavour, a duty to
either look for or report secondary findings is even less likely to be considered fair, just
and reasonable. However, the boundary between clinical care and practise is not well
defined for genomics and, as these techniques begin to be used as clinical tests, and the
relationship between the parties becomes more clearly that of clinical care team and
patient, it is more likely that a duty to feed back certain kinds of secondary findings will
develop. In practise, the existence and nature of that duty will be determined by answer-
ing both whether a duty would be reasonable and what the appropriate standard of care is
in deciding which secondary findings should be validated and returned to patients.
In terms of the standard of care, in English law, the standard expected of a skilled
professional is generally that of a reasonably competent member of that specialism or
profession; if a doctor reaches the standard of a responsible body of medical opinion, he
is not negligent. In medical negligence, the assessment of what is reasonable is largely
guided by the Bolam test58: action must be in accordance with a practise accepted as
proper by a responsible body of medical opinion, as long as this practise could not be
rejected as incapable of standing up to rational analysis (the qualification made in the
Bolitho case).59 In such a new area, the possibility for divergence among professionals
makes determining an appropriate legal standard more complicated.
In the United Kingdom, the 100,000 Genomes Project has developed an intermediate
approach to secondary findings – between the ACMG and ESHG positions. It has
developed a list of genes in which a very limited number of known, pathogenic mutations
58. Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582.
59. Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] UKHL 46; [1998] AC 232; [1997] 4 All
ER 771.
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of high clinical relevance are investigated if the participant consents. This list is more
limited than that developed by the ACMG but also includes optional carrier status for a
small number of recessive conditions where both parents participate and X-linked carrier
status in women.60 Participants are offered screening of genes in these categories, if
appropriate, during the process of seeking informed consent, and their choices are
recorded on the consent form. In accordance with Good Clinical Practice, a copy is
stored in the participant’s hospital notes and a copy is sent with their sample for central
storage. As described above, feedback of incidental findings may involve an MDT or
advisory board of experts to help evaluate results, based on expected pathogenicity and
other factors.61 This process could therefore fulfil the classic Bolam and Bolitho tests, as
long as the development of the gene lists and decisions about results are well founded.
Even when a field is developing and approaches are not uniform (as with the differences
between ACMG and ESHG recommendations), it is likely that courts will treat well-
founded guidance as evidence of a responsible body of medical opinion.62 However, this
does not necessarily end the debate on the standard of care required in dealing with
secondary findings. As we will see below, the courts in England and Wales have taken a
new direction in some cases concerned with disclosure of medical risks and have applied
a standard that reflects more closely what a patient might reasonably want to know.63
This case law could complicate the assessment of appropriate standards if it is found to
apply to the disclosure of genomic information to patients.
Patient-centric disclosure? The ACMG and 100,000 Genome Project secondary findings
gene lists use clinical ‘actionability’ as the main criterion for inclusion. However, there is
limited evidence concerning the relative importance of this or other factors for stake-
holders, including participants. For example, knowledge of possession of certain genetic
variants might be considered important by individuals, even if not clinically actionable
or even relevant to healthcare, as part of a fulfilment of a right to self-determination and
autonomy. Some results that are not considered clinically actionable would be important
to some patients in making future decisions about their health and reproduction. The
courts in the United Kingdom have required a more patient-centric approach to infor-
mation disclosure in some aspects of medical practise, including determining what
information a patient should be provided with as part of the consent process. This
60. Genomics England, 2015, ‘The 100,000 Genomes Project Protocol’, 16 May. Available at:
www.genomicsengland.co.uk/download/100000-genomes-project-protocol-2015-17/, at 6.1
(accessed 21 June 2015).
61. This approach is taken in Oxford where genome sequencing is being carried out by the NIHR
Biomedical Research Centre; a collaboration between Oxford University Hospitals NHS
Foundation Trust and the University of Oxford (www.oxfordbrc.nihr.ac.uk). It is also the
approach of genomic medicine centres in the Netherlands: Rigter et al., ‘Reflecting on
Earlier Experiences with Unsolicited Findings’, p. 1324.
62. A. Samanta et al., ‘The Role of Clinical Guidelines in Medical Negligence Litigation: A Shift
from the Bolam Standard?’, Medical Law Review 321(14) (2006), p. 321, at p. 344.
63. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11.
Mitchell et al. 169
patient-centric approach could influence the courts in deciding which information should
be given to patients during clinical genome sequencing.
Historically, in the context of consent and disclosure of risk, the courts endorsed the
reasonable professional’s (Bolam) standard for the disclosure of risk and rejected a
standard based on what the reasonable patient would want to know; suggesting that it
is generally for the doctors to decide what risks should be communicated.64 However,
more recently, the Supreme Court (SC) handed down unanimous judgment in the case of
Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board which sets a new standard on disclosure of
risk.65 This was a claim brought by a patient, Mrs Montgomery, who gave birth to a child
who sustained severe brain damage as a result of complications in labour caused by
shoulder dystocia. She claimed that doctors had negligently failed to warn her of the risk
of shoulder dystocia and that, had she been warned, she would have asked for a surgical
delivery. It was agreed at trial that the general risk of shoulder dystocia in diabetic
mothers – such as Mrs Montgomery – is around 9–10%. However, the responsible doctor
said that it was not her practise to discuss this risk because she felt that the risk of ‘grave
problems’ resulting from shoulder dystocia was very small but that despite this, most
women would instead choose caesarean section if so warned. The SC unanimously found
in favour of Mrs Montgomery66 and set out a new test for the disclosure of risk in
medical law, clarifying several decades of uncertain case law in the process. The SC
emphasized that the Bolam test of ‘conduct supported by a responsible body of medical
opinion’ is inappropriate in the context of risk disclosure and consent. The court held that
it would be wrong to regard the previous leading case of Sidaway67 as an unqualified
endorsement of the application of the Bolam test to the giving of advice about treatment.
Instead, they considered that Lord Woolf MR’s assessment in Pearce68 was correct in
deciding that a ‘significant risk which would affect the judgment of the reasonable
patient’ should be disclosed.69 Following Montgomery, the test to determine whether
a risk is ‘material’ and should be disclosed is now whether:
64. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871; [1985] 2
WLR 480.
65. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11.
66. There has been significant debate of this decision. For example, Jonathan and Elsa
Montgomery criticize the court’s assessment of the evidence in the case and of the reality
of medical decision-making in line with best practise in these circumstances. Farell and
Brazier are more supportive of the decision: J. Montgomery and E. Montgomery,
‘Montgomery on Informed Consent: An Inexpert Decision?’, Journal of Medical Ethics
42 (2016), p. 89; A.M. Farell and M. Brazier, ‘Not So New Directions in the Law of
Consent? Examining Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board’, Journal of Medical
Ethics 42(2) (2015), pp. 85–88.
67. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871; [1985] 2
WLR 480.
68. Pearce v. United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] PIQR P 53.
69. Although in Pearce Lord Woolf MR appeared to define ‘significant’ from the perspective of
the doctor.
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[A] reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the
risk or if the doctor should reasonably be aware that this particular patient would be likely to
attach significance to it.70
The SC drew a distinction between the Bolam standard of a reasonable body of
medical opinion that should still apply to decisions about which investigatory or treat-
ment options should be considered and the provision of information about risks, which
does not require special medical skill:
The former role is an exercise of professional skill and judgement: what risks of
injury are involved in an operation, for example, is a matter falling within the
expertise of members of the medical profession. But it is a non sequitur to conclude
that the question whether a risk of injury, or the availability of an alternative form of
treatment, ought to be discussed with the patient is also a matter of purely profes-
sional judgment. The doctor’s advisory role cannot be regarded as solely an exercise
of medical skill without leaving out of account the patient’s entitlement to decide on
the risks.71
This decision was influenced by the importance of the value of self-determination
under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as considered by the
courts since the Sidaway case72 and by the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedi-
cine.73 In her concurring judgment, Lady Hale also emphasized that the interests which
the law of negligence now protects include ‘a person’s interest in their own physical and
psychiatric integrity, an important feature of which is their autonomy’ and agreed with
Jonathan Herring that the issue is whether enough information is provided to give ‘due
protection to the patient’s right of autonomy’.74
This test has already been applied to genetic information. In Mrs A v. East Kent
University NHS Foundation Trust, it was claimed that a material risk of a chromosomal
abnormality should have been disclosed to Mrs A during her pregnancy.75 This was a
very rare chromosomal abnormality with only one other potentially similar case known
worldwide. The judge found that the risk of chromosomal abnormality from the evidence
at the time was too slight (well below 1%) to require further investigation. Applying
Montgomery, the judge also found that there was no reason to discuss such a risk because
‘a reasonable patient, in the position of Mrs A, would have attached no significance to
risks at this background level. Further . . . I do not find Mrs A would have attached
70. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [87].
71. Op. cit., para. 83.
72. Op. cit., para. 80.
73. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard
to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
(opened for signature 4 March 1997, entered into force 1 December 1999) CETS No. 164.
74. J. Herring, Medical Law and Ethics. 4th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2012), p. 170.
75. Mrs A v. East Kent Hospitals University NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWHC 1038 (QB);
[2015] Med LR 262.
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significance to these levels of risk.’76 However, it is currently uncertain quite how
Montgomery would apply in the context of clinical genomics and whether this standard
could apply to the disclosure of results and information about potential diagnoses rather
than the risks of intervention and consent.
In terms of consent and the risks of intervention,Montgomery now suggests that consent
to genome sequencing requires careful consideration of which risks are ‘material’ and
potentially significant to an individual patient. Whether this applies to non-physical ‘risks’
is unclear; Could this extend to a material risk of psychological harm due to uncertainty of
results, for example? In order to be ‘material’ this would need to be a risk of inflicting a
recognized psychiatric disorder as a result of such uncertainty. It cannot be concluded that
the ‘reasonable patient’ standard will be transplanted to apply in the context of disclosure
of findings, but it is clear that Montgomery sets a more subjective standard that considers
the position of the specific patient. This judgment and its partial approval for the principle
of autonomy as a basis for information standards may signal a more expansive approach in
this area and could support a duty to disclose wider findings than HCPs have decided to
return if a patient may find them important for self-determination (for example, for repro-
ductive choices). Alternatively, Montgomery also makes clear that there is still a narrow
‘therapeutic exception’ to disclosure of risk where it is reasonable to withhold information
if it would be seriously detrimental to a patient’s health (although the judgment suggests
that this would be a rare occurrence).77 The existence of this ‘therapeutic privilege’ holds
out the prospect of an exception to disclosure, it could be argued, to prevent significant
psychological harm from disclosure of wider and less certain WGS results.
The key question in terms of feedback of secondary findings is what test would be
applied to determine what is reasonable? A standard based on a reasonable body of
medical opinion or a standard that seeks to provide protection to a patient’s right to self-
determination and autonomy? This matter is further complicated in the case of the
developing child in pregnancy cases or for minors, whose autonomy might instead
provide a reason not to disclose adult-onset conditions.
Are duties owed to relatives in Clinical Genomics?
The question of whether there ought to be a duty of care to inform family members of
information that might affect their health or life choices has always been central to
Clinical Genetics practice, and the introduction of WES/WGS may increase the like-
lihood of such information coming to light. HCPs do not generally owe duties to those
who fall outside their care according to English Law,78 and there is a significant weight
of case law against duties to third parties in negligence,79 the general rule being that
76. Op. cit., para. 89.
77. Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [85], [88] & [91].
78. Powell v. Boladz (1997) 39 BMLR 35; [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Med 116, CA.
79. R. Mulheron, Medical Negligence: Non-Patient and Third Party Claims (Ashgate
Publishing, Ltd, 2010), p. 8; Perhaps the most recent powerful authority against a duty to
third parties is the House of Lords decision in Mitchell & Anor v. Glasgow City Council
[2009] UKHL 11; [2009] 2 WLR 481, Farnham.
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HCPs do not owe a duty to non-patients and third parties.80 However, there are factors
that suggest genetic relatives may be successful in claims based on a failure to warn. The
increasing importance of this issue is demonstrated by two recent cases.
ABC v. St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust. In ABC, the claimant was the daughter of a man
diagnosed with Huntington’s disease. She claimed that a duty of care was owed to warn
her of the possibility that she had inherited the condition and could pass it on to her
children, against the wishes of her father who had refused to disclose this piece of
confidential information.81 The claimant was not party to a doctor–patient relationship
and this potential duty of care to a ‘third party’ was recognized by the judge as ‘entirely
novel’.82 On the basis of the parties’ submissions, Mr Justice Nicol concluded that there
was ‘no reasonably arguable duty of care’,83 and the claim was struck out. This was
largely on the basis that such a duty would conflict with the well-established duty of
confidentiality owed by doctors to their patients and could not be seen as an incremental
extension of the law of negligence.84 For these and other reasons, Nicol J concluded that
imposing a duty of care would not be fair, just and reasonable.
There are a number of factors in favour of a duty of care that were not considered as
part of Nicol J’s analysis. In this regard, reference can be made to a number of legal
scholars arguing that some form of duty to relatives could be anticipated,85 and factors
that have led to courts in other jurisdictions, for example, in States of the United States,
taking a broader approach. In Pate v. Threlkel,86 the Florida SC found a duty to warn the
patient that their children may have a risk of illness. This approach was approved by the
Minnesota SC inMolloy v. Meier,87 which found a duty was owed to biological parents to
80. Mulheron, Medical Negligence, p. 18.
81. ABC v. St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust & Ors [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB); [2015] Med LR
307.
82. Op. cit., para. 23.
83. Op. cit., para. 31.
84. This conclusion has been contested. For example see: R. Gilbar and C. Foster, ‘Doctors’
Liability to the Patient’s Relatives in Genetic Medicine; ABC v. St George’s Healthcare NHS
Trust [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB)’, Medical Law Review 24 (1) 2016, pp. 112–123. DOI: 10.
1093/medlaw/fwv037; C. Mitchell et al., ‘A Duty To Warn Relatives in Clinical Genetics:
Arguably ‘Fair just and reasonable’ in English Law?’, Tottel’s Journal of Professional
Negligence 32 (2016), pp. 120–136.
85. M. Fay, ‘Informing the Family: A Geneticist’s Duty of Care to Disclose Genetic Risks to
Relatives of the Proband’, Professional Negligence 27 (2011), p. 97; L.J. Deftos, ‘Genomic
Torts: The Law of the Future – The Duty of Physicians to Disclose the Presence of a Genetic
Disease to the Relatives of Their Patients with the Disease’, University of San Francisco Law
Review 32 (1997), p. 138; S.L. Keeling, ‘Duty to Warn of Genetic Harm in Breach of Patient
Confidentiality’, Journal of Law and Medicine 12 (2004), p. 235; Mulheron, Medical
Negligence, 2010.; V. Chico, Genomic Negligence: An Interest in Autonomy as the Basis
for Novel Negligence Claims Generated by Genetic Technology (Abingdon: Taylor &
Francis, 2011).
86. Pate v. Threlkel (1995) 661 So 2d 278.
87. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711(Minn. 2004).
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conduct Fragile X testing of their child and to communicate the diagnosis to them, although
this did not require direct communication with the parents by those conducting the test.88
However, the Superior Court of New Jersey Court in Safer v. Estate of Pack took a broader
approach – drawing on infectious disease case law – to find a duty to warn a non-patient
daughter directly. A key factor in reaching this decision was that the group to which a duty
would potentially be owedwas easily identified and that there would only be a duty to warn
directlywhere substantial harmcould beavertedorminimized.The impact ofSaferhas been
tempered by the New Jersey Genetic Privacy Act, which prohibits disclosure of genetic
information (that could identify the patient) without consent but its reasoning remains a
useful precedent in the common law.89 These cases were not considered by Nicol J.
Although it may not be easy to fit a duty to warn alongside the established duty of
confidentiality, it is clear in English law that a breach of confidence may be justified to
protect important rights and to prevent serious harm.90 There are indications that many
patients are willing to forgo their confidentiality for relatives to be informed,91 and most
recent professional guidance also acknowledges that genetic information may be rele-
vant to the patient’s relatives and that patients should be informed of this.92 Established
clinical practice is to facilitate and empower patients to communicate genetic risk to their
relatives, through provision of tailored letters addressed ‘to whom it may concern’.
Guidance from the General Medical Council (GMC) on confidentiality acknowledges
that informing relatives against the express wishes of a patient could be justified in
certain circumstances where another person is at risk of ‘serious harm’.93 In determining
whether to disclose against a patient’s consent and in the ‘public interest’, the guidance
emphasizes that only a serious risk could outweigh the patient’s and public interest in
confidentiality.94 It is unclear precisely how a risk of serious harm would be interpreted
in the context of genetic risk, but it is clearly possible that a risk of serious illness or
death (e.g., where a BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene mutation is identified in a parent, confer-
ring a serious increased risk of breast cancer if inherited by a daughter) which could be
88. Safer v. Estate of Pack (1996) 677 2d 1188 (Appellate Div).
89. Fay, ‘Negligence, Genetics and Families’, p. 11. However, there may be some caution in the
relevance of US case law for UK legal development. As J. Moorland suggests in The CJD
Litigation; ‘The culture of American personal injury litigation is very different from ours and
thus public policy considerations’ (1997) 41 BMLR 157, [161]-[162].
90. This is discussed further by Graeme Laurie in G.T. Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to
Medico-Legal Norms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 219.
91. T.J. Heaton and V. Chico, ‘Attitudes Towards the Sharing of Genetic Information with At-
Risk Relatives: Results of a Quantitative Survey’, Human Genetics 135 (2015), p. 109.
92. A. Lucassen and A. Hall, ‘Consent and Confidentiality in Clinical Genetic Practice:
Guidance on Genetic Testing and Sharing Genetic Information’, Clinical Medicine 12
(2012), p. 5.
93. General Medical Council, 2009, ‘Confidentiality Guidance: Genetic and Other Shared
Information’, 12 October. Available at: www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/
confidentiality_67_69_genetic_and_other_shared_information.asp (accessed 20 November
2014), paras 67–69.
94. Op. cit., para. 55.
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avoided or ameliorated by early preventative measures or treatment could outweigh a
patient’s confidentiality. This guidance suggests that it is good practice to inform a
patient about the relevance of information to their relatives and advise them to dis-
close risks to family. GMC guidance also suggests it may be justified to disclose
directly to relatives, even against the patient’s express wishes, in some extreme
circumstances. The rationale for this type of approach was set out by the Joint Com-
mittee on Medical Genetics on Consent and Confidentiality in Clinical Genetic Prac-
tice: ‘The assumption that confidentiality is always paramount is as inappropriate as
the assumption that disclosure is always permissible, and the decision will need to be
tailored to the individual circumstances of the case.’95 The SC has also made clear
that it may be desirable for the law to set the standards required in the performance of
professional duties.96
A highly persuasive aspect of the application to strike out the claim in ABC v. St
George’s Healthcare NHS Trust was that duties of care should be extended only incre-
mentally from some well-established legal duty, and the judge instead felt that recogniz-
ing a duty to warn genetic relatives would be a ‘giant step’ in the law’s development
(referring to the judgment of Lord Toulson in Michael v. Chief Constable of the South
Wales Police). However, this admittedly well-established point could be challenged in
these specific circumstances. As Lord Toulson himself makes clear, argument by incre-
mental analogy is only part of the analysis and it may be that an ‘earlier limitation is no
longer logically or socially justifiable’ and also that ‘[o]ften there will be a mixture of
policy considerations to take into account’.97 Significant social and justice considera-
tions are at least arguable in the case of genetic relatives at risk of serious harm. There are
also some indications that the courts are able to contemplate a duty of care to the non-
patient where they are a family member who is bound up in the same circumstances, such
as the care and treatment involved in pregnancy. In the case of Anderson v. Forth Valley
Health Board, the court found a duty of care in prenatal genetic testing was owed to the
father, despite it being the mother who was the patient.98 Moreover, Clinical Genetics
practice, although recognizing the confidential nature of information from the individ-
ual, where possible, clearly acknowledges the familial nature of genetic information. By
extending the legal duty of care to close genetic relatives, arguably this would be a
narrow extension to a limited and identifiable group who could benefit from a duty.99
95. Royal College of Physicians, Royal College of Pathologists and British Society for Human
Genetics, 2011, ‘Report of the Joint Committee on Medical Genetics; Consent and
Confidentiality in Clinical Genetic Practice: guidance on genetic testing and sharing
genetic information,’ September 2011. Available at: www.bsgm.org.uk/media/678746/
consent_and_confidentiality_2011.pdf (accessed 21 June 2015).
96. Per. Lord Kerr and Lord Reed; Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11
[93].
97. Michael & Ors v. The Chief Constable of South Wales Police & Anor [2015] UKSC 2; [2015]
AC 1732, [102].
98. Anderson v. Forth Valley Health Board [1998] S.L.T. 588
99. Dheensa et al., ‘Health-Care Professionals’ Responsibility’, pp. 290–301.
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This type of duty could be seen as a more incremental extension of the law than was
suggested by the defendants in ABC.
The claimant appealed against Nicol J’s decision to strike out her claim. The Court
of Appeal decided to allow her appeal, agreeing that a duty of care was arguable and
that such arguments should be made in full at trial.100 Handing down the unanimous
judgment, Irwin LJ found scope for reasonable argument in most aspects of the
defendants’ submissions. It was recognized that there were no direct precedents for
this claim in English law but Irwin LJ did approve parallels in foreign cases, includ-
ing Safer v. Pack, as support for an argument that the extension of a duty to relatives
in clinical genetics could be a reasonable, incremental development of the law of
negligence.101 Irwin LJ closely analysed California SC decisions in Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California102 and Rowland v. Christian which were
forerunners of the favourable decision in Safer and where, in Rowland, it was recog-
nized that
[t]he court have carved out an exception to [the rule against third party disclosure] in cases
in which the defendant stands in some special relationship to either the person whose
conduct needs to be controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that
conduct.103
We accordingly await the full trial for an answer on whether, following the Court of
Appeal analysis and acknowledgement that a duty to third parties may exist, such duty of
care will be found to have existed in the circumstances of ABC.
Connor Smith v. University of Leicester NHS Trust. The initial judgment in ABC was quickly
followed by a second case, Connor Smith (heard when the appeal in ABC was pending),
where the claims of non-patient relatives were also struck out.104 In this case, it was
alleged that there had been a negligent delay in testing a patient, the claimants’ second
cousin Mr Craven, for adrenomyeloneuropathy (AMN). This is a genetic disease affect-
ing the brain. But for this negligent delay – of more than 3 years in testing for AMC – it
was claimed that the condition would have been detected and family members would
have also been tested. The claimants, Connor and Callum Smith, claimed they could
have been diagnosed earlier with the childhood version of the condition and given
treatment that might have led to a significantly better outcome for both boys. The test
for AMN had originally been requested by Mr Craven’s clinician in 2003 but did not take
place. It was only once the boys had been diagnosed in 2006 that the same Consultant
Neurologist noticed his request had not been carried out and the test was ordered again.
As in ABC, His Honour Judge McKenna struck out the claim, finding that it ‘would not
be fair, just and reasonable on policy grounds to impose a duty of care on the defendant
100. ABC v. St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust & Others [2017] EWCA Civ 336.
101. Op. cit., paras 46–63.
102. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1976) 551 P.2d 334.
103. Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108.
104. Smith & Anor v. University of Leicester NHS Trust [2016] EWHC 817 (QB).
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in respect of those who are not its patients’.105 He concluded that it was the settled policy
of the law not to grant ‘remedies to third parties for the effects of injuries to other people
and what the claimants seek in this case is to introduce an exception to that approach’.106
No exception had succeeded in the past and it would not be fair, just and reasonable, in
his opinion, for it to succeed in this case.
Although there are similarities with ABC – a claim by non-patient genetic relatives
that they should have been warned of genetic risk – this was not a case based on non-
disclosure of available information involving a conflict with patient confidentiality. The
claimants argued that this difference restricted the relevance of ABC107 but this was
rejected by the Judge, who decided that Nicol J’s decision in ABC set a precedent against
a duty of care to non-patients in general and was not restricted to circumstances involv-
ing patient confidentiality. Unlike ABC, the issue of proximity between the defendant
and the claimants was contested and it is clear that the distance between them was a
concern for the Judge who decided that ‘to extend the duty of care to the patient’s second
cousins’ would be unreasonable.108 He was unmoved by the argument that there was an
assumption of responsibility by the NHS Trust towards the wider family or that this point
should at least be argued at a full hearing.109 Some of the same criticisms can be made of
this court decision as of Nicol J’s decision in ABC. There was little consideration of the
familial approach of clinical genetics and the fact that extending a duty of care to genetic
relatives in certain circumstances would not be a giant step for clinicians, who are
already very aware of familial implications. The court also failed to consider the exten-
sion of duties in other jurisdictions to reflect this.
However, Connor Smith is a different case to those based on a failure to warn relatives
of a genetic diagnosis. The distance between the parties (the daughter in ABCwas known
to the clinicians) was greater in a physical sense and, as opposed to ABC, the defendants
may not have even been aware of the existence of the second cousins.110 In this case, the
claimed duty was not to warn relatives that they were at risk of illness but – arguably a
more onerous duty – to perform genetic testing in the patient, in order to provide risk
information for their relatives. This is one-step forward from discovery of information
which could benefit relatives. It is also a potentially onerous duty to find and contact
relatives who are physically further away and perhaps not well known to either the
patient or clinicians. And, although the lack of conflict with patient confidentiality in
this case removes a major element of the argument against a duty that was so persuasive
in the initial application to strike out in ABC, carrying out testing, as opposed to disclo-
sure of results, is not an aspect of practice where the guidance in the United Kingdom
explicitly recommends the consideration of relatives’ interests. Indeed the Court of
Appeal in ABC acknowledged this aspect when commenting upon the important
105. Op. cit., para. 30.
106. Op. cit., para. 29.
107. Op. cit., para. 24.
108. Op. cit., para. 29.
109. Op. cit., paras 26–27.
110. Although the Consultant was aware of them by 2006; Op. cit., para. 8.
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distinction of the unpredictable nature of risks to potential victims and the possibility of
unnecessary warnings being given in a general clinical environment and clinical genet-
ics, where testing has already been carried out: ‘the obligation will usually arise from a
specific quantifiable risk. Indeed it is one of the clinical functions of the geneticist to
calculate the risk’.111
Although the UK courts may be more likely to recognize a duty to advise the patient
of risk to relatives, these recent challenges demonstrate there is a case to be argued that a
duty of care exists – at least in some circumstances where the proximity between the
parties is sufficiently close – to warn relatives directly of genetic risks. As genome-wide
testing begins to be used in clinical care, more results will be discovered that might have
clinical significance for relatives and the legal duties involved are likely to be tested
further.
This and the previous section have analysed the potential legal response to aspects of
developing practice in clinical genomics, the next section will consider which profes-
sionals may owe a duty to patients, participants or their relatives.
Is a duty of care owed by researchers, scientists and non-clinical professionals?
A key legal question given the current interdisciplinary nature of genome sequencing is
whether, and in what circumstances, the professionals involved in clinical WES/WGS
owe a legal duty of care to the patient? In addition to patient-facing HCPs, a range of
other professionals such as clinical lab scientists, bioinformaticians and researchers may
be involved in the generation, analysis and interpretation of genome sequence data. As a
starting point, the clinical care team owe a duty of care to their patient. As set out in the
Caparo formulation, a duty of care will only exist if there is a relationship of proximity
between the person who owes the duty (such as a doctor) and the subject of the duty (the
patient). The concept of proximity involves the notion of nearness or closeness and
includes physical proximity (in the sense of space and time), circumstantial proximity,
causal proximity and assumption of responsibility.112 It is well established in law that
doctors owe a duty of care to patients because of the ‘close direct relationship’ between
them.113 For a duty of care to be found on the part of professionals who are not part of the
clinical care team, a claimant would need to establish proximity and persuade the court
that such a duty would be ‘fair, just and reasonable’. The analysis of this will depend on
the nature of the duty alleged – for example, to feed back certain findings – but there are
some factors that will be influential in most circumstances.
It was established in The Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Litigation that researchers may
owe a duty of care to research participants ‘akin to that of doctor and patient, one of close
proximity.’114 However, this duty was found in a clinical trial which then became a part
of medical practice. Perhaps because this was a therapeutic programme and very close to
clinical care, a duty of care was established without considering proximity between
111. ABC v. St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust & Others [2017] EWCA Civ 336, 56.
112. Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman (1985) 60 A.L.R. 1.
113. Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1968] 1 All ER 1068.
114. The Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Litigation (1997) QB 41 BMLR 157, 164.
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researchers and participants thoroughly. Following this, it has been suggested that the
taking on of a clinical role by the professional or the close relationship between research
and therapy could be persuasive in finding a duty of care.115 It could be argued that those
professionals who can be said to play a ‘therapeutic role’ in clinical genomics might be
subject to a duty of care to patients. But this invites a potentially difficult question –
What constitutes ‘therapeutic’? Determining this may be particularly difficult where
non-clinically qualified individuals contribute to provision of clinical information, as
may be the case with research results from ‘hybrid’ genomics projects, or where the
‘researcher’ is a clinician carrying out research alongside their clinical work.
Previous judicial consideration concerning the difficulty of determining a boundary
between clinical activities and research undertaken by clinicians took place in Walker
Smith v. GMC, a review of a decision by the Fitness to Practise Panel of the Royal
College of Physicians (RCP).116 Drawing on clinical guidance at the time, Mitting J
found that the clinician’s intentions were relevant to determining whether an activity was
research or medical care. However, it was also clear that experimental medical care need
not constitute research as long as its goal was the care of the patient and that there was a
‘reasonable chance of success’.117 That test is subjective and in the judge’s view
When the person undertaking the activity has two purposes or when different people
participating in the same series of activities have different purposes, it may be very difficult
to say into which category the activities fall. This difficulty is particularly likely to arise in
activities undertaken by an academic clinician and/or in a teaching hospital with a research
department.118
This indicates some factors that could be important in assessing whether or not a duty
of care would be ‘fair, just and reasonable’ in the law of negligence; it is possible that a
clinician would be considered to be carrying out clinical activity (and therefore should
meet clinical standards of care) where a goal of the project is also the care of the patient.
This could be the case, despite the labelling of sequencing as ‘research’ or obtaining of
research ethics approval. In other jurisdictions, including other common law jurisdic-
tions such as Canada, it has also been established that researchers owe a duty of care to
research participants.119 If the decisions made by these wider professionals shape the
knowledge, care and information provided to the patient, there may be reasons under that
heading which could persuade a court that such a duty would be ‘fair, just and reason-
able’. To understand how the courts might approach this, further analysis is required of
the roles of all the professionals involved in genomics; their influence on patient care and
the expectations that are developed in relevant professional or ethical guidance.
115. J. Kaye et al., Ethical, Legal and Social Issues Arising from the Use of GWAS in Medical
Research, March 2009, Available at: https://wellcome.ac.uk/sites/default/files/wtx058032.
pdf (accessed 21 June 2015).
116. Walker-Smith v. General Medical Council [2012] EWHC 503 (Admin).
117. Op. cit., para. 16.
118. Op. cit.
119. Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan [1965] 52 W.W.R. 608 (Sask. C.A.).
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A second potential source of liability for these wider professionals is a duty of care
towards the clinical care team for the reasonableness, accuracy and competence of their
work. In a sense, this could be seen as analogous with the duty of care of professional
advisors towards other professionals – a duty of care one step removed from the patient.
Researchers could be liable to patients in a way analogous to surveyors120 or expert third
parties (e.g., testing laboratories121) in that the advice/service is provided to the clinic,
not the patient, but the patient is reliant on appropriate information being passed to their
clinical care team. In these circumstances, the patient could be argued as reasonably
within the contemplation of the researcher, suggesting that a duty could be fair, just and
reasonable. As practice develops, particularly in the investigation and analysis of wider
findings from genomics, the potential existence and scope of such duties would benefit
from further analysis.
Conclusions on the duty of care in clinical NGS
This article identifies novel duties that may arise in UK law in the context of genome and
exome sequencing in the clinic. First, a duty may be found to return certain findings that
do not pertain to the presenting health condition, either on a case-by-case basis if they are
discovered ‘incidentally’ or as part of a standard investigation of some ‘additional’
findings if evidence accumulating in the field suggests that this is reasonable. Although
there is currently no consensus on return of findings from genomics, as genome sequen-
cing becomes a clinical (rather than solely research) test, a duty of care could well be
established to provide significant incidental or additional results. From a legal perspec-
tive, this view raises to important questions of the legal standard of care in clinical
sequencing. This issue may need separation into two parts. First, a standard of profes-
sional skill and competence will apply to decisions about what should be investigated,
which results are analysed fully and whether results should be re-evaluated in the future.
This standard is one of practice in accordance with a responsible body of medical
opinion (the Bolam standard), and in many cases, this may be straightforward. A range
of approaches to which findings should automatically be investigated or excluded is
likely to be reasonable given the current state of the art and guidance on management of
incidental findings. Second, a different standard may apply to the practice of consent and
return of results following the case law that emphasizes the respect for a patient’s
autonomy and right to self-determination. Following Montgomery, it is clear that all the
‘material risks’ that a reasonable patient (or a particular patient) would attach signifi-
cance to should be disclosed as part of the consent process. This might extend to
disclosure when discussing a general course of action, such as continuing with a preg-
nancy. Whether material risks also include less direct harms, such as psychological harm
due to uncertainty in WES/WGS results, are unclear. The tenor of this case law suggests
increasing respect for self-determination and autonomy, and this may influence the
courts’ assessment of the duty of care as it applies to the return of genomic results to
120. Smith v. Eric S Bush (A Firm) [1990] UKHL 1; [1989] 2 WLR 790.
121. Farraj & Anor v. King’s Healthcare NHS Trust (KCH) & Ors [2009] EWCA Civ 1203.
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patients as well. This would be in line with the European human rights framework and
Article 10 of the Biomedicine Convention, which asserts a right to information about
personal health.
A second novel duty of care is also plausible, a duty of care to warn genetic relatives
directly in very limited circumstances. This has been found to be at least arguable by the
Court of Appeal in ABC, albeit highly dependent on the factual circumstances in which it
is argued that such a duty exists. The latest medical guidance suggests a professional
duty to consider warning relatives of a significant genetic risk of serious harm and such a
duty has been found in other jurisdictions. The courts in England and Wales have been
reluctant to impose liability towards those who are not technically seen as ‘patients’ of
the defendant, but we argue that such an approach is insufficiently informed by contem-
porary practise in clinical genetics and genomics and the Court of Appeal utterances in
ABC appear to support this argument.
Third, it is possible that a duty of care to investigate and feed back results could be
found on the part of some researchers and wider professionals (non-clinicians) in geno-
mics towards patients if there are sufficient factors of ‘proximity’ and considerations that
would make such a duty ‘fair, just and reasonable’. These are more likely to be found if a
researcher also has a therapeutic role or the research project aims to have a potential
impact on therapeutic outcomes or management. Further work is required that analyses
the precise relationships and roles of professionals in genomics against the factors
considered by the courts as part of the questions of proximity and whether a duty of
care is fair, just and reasonable.
As projects such as the 100,000 Genomes Project proceed in the United Kingdom,
further analysis of the legal issues outlined in this article is required. However, an attempt
to establish the parameters of a duty of care from one holistic doctrine is difficult. In
practice, the development of duties and their limits within the courts is not easy to predict
and will depend on the individual circumstances of the case and the factors that a particular
court considers most important at the time. For clinicians and professionals involved in
hybrid projects and clinical genomics, a more practical approach might be to set out a
framework for decision-making involving a set of principles and factors to take into
account in different circumstances. For clinicians or researchers, decisions involve con-
sideration of whether a duty of care exists and to whom, the scope of the duty, whether it is
appropriately discharged and ultimately the consequences of not doing so. The legal issues
outlined in this article should be considered by those developing decision-making gui-
dance and frameworks used by HCPs and researchers.
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